Fraglets represent an execution model for communication protocols that resembles the chemical reactions in living organisms. The strong connection between their way of transforming and reacting and formal rewriting systems makes a fraglet program amenable to automatic verification. Grounded on past work, this paper investigates feasibility of adopting fraglets as model for specifying security protocols and analysing their properties. In particular, we give concrete sample analyses over a secure RFID protocol, showing evolution of the protocol run as chemical dynamics and simulating an adversary trying to circumvent the intended steps. The results of our analysis confirm the effectiveness of the cryptofraglets framework for the model and analysis of security properties and eventually show its potential to identify and uncover protocol flaws.
tion model where computations are carried out by having fraglets react with each other. They were originally introduced to automatise the protocol development process, from design, to implementation, and deployment. In the past, main fields of applications have been protocol resilience and genetic programming experiments, see, e.g. [26, 27, 30, 31] . With an eye to modelling security protocols and verifying security properties, the original pool of fraglets' instructions have been incrementally extended in the past years to deal with symmetric cryptography [24] , access control mechanisms [15] , and dedicated primitives for trust management [16] . This led to the definition of cryptofraglets, i.e., fraglets enriched with capabilities of encrypting, decrypting, signing, and verifying signatures over a series of symbols. Successively, work in [17] showed a more concrete advancement towards adopting fraglets for security modelling and verification, by proposing an executable specification of cryptofraglets in Maude [4, 18] , the popular engine based on rewriting logic [20] .
In [25] , we enriched the cryptofraglets set of instructions with specific functionalities for hashing and message authentication coding: these functionalities are particularly significant, constituting the basic building blocks in many protocols. The same work also proposed a completely renewed executable specification of cryptofraglets in Maude.
Here, the effectiveness of the enhanced framework is demonstrated by presenting a Maude specification of a privacy preserving RFID identification protocol, RIPP-FS [5, 6] , under the fraglets communication paradigm. The protocol provides a series of features, including: secrecy of the shared key used to authenticate the tag to the reader; tag privacy, intended as un-linkability of two, or more, answers coming from the same tag, against a passive adversary that eavesdrops two (or more) protocol sessions; de-synchronization resistance, which protects the protocol against Denial-of-Service attacks; and forward secrecy, i.e., impossibility for an active adversary that has captured a tag to know which previously eavesdropped answers have been produced by that tag. The specification of RIPP-FS in Maude allows for the automated analysis of such features. With respect to [25] , we show extended examples of such analyses, serving as a proof of concept to demonstrate feasibility of modelling and analysing security protocols specified via fraglets.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls the (crypto)fraglets model. Section 4 shows a fragletsbased instantiation of one session of the RIPP-FS protocol, highlighting some Maude capabilities to perform automatic analyses on the protocol execution. In Section 5, we briefly revise related work in the area of fraglets and rewrite systems. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Fraglets
A fraglet is denoted as [s1 s2 . . . tail], where si (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a symbol and tail is a (possibly empty) sequence of symbols. Nodes of a communication network may process fraglets as follows. Each node maintains a fraglet store to which incoming fraglets are added. Fraglets may be processed only within a store. The send (mcast) instruction transfers a fraglet from a source store to a destination store (to a set of destination stores).
Fraglets are processed through a simple prefix programming language. Transformation instructions involve a single fraglet, while reaction instructions involve two fraglets. The interested reader can find a comprehensive tutorial in [12] , while Table 1 and Table 2 show the core instructions that serve in the following.
Two fraglets react by instruction match, and their tails are concatenated. With the catalytic matchp, the reaction rule persists. Table 2 reports two particular transformation instructions used for enabling communication. In particular, send performs a communication between two fraglets stores. It transfers a fraglet from store S A to store S B . Notation
denotes that the fraglet is located at S A . The name of the destination store is given by the second symbol in the original fraglet [send S B tail]. Where not strictly necessary, we omit this to make the name of the store explicit.
The mcast instruction models a multicast communication, namely a communication from a store to a group of other stores, listed in symbol Slist, which represents a list of stores. In case Slist is composed of all possible receivers, mcast acts a broadcast. This instruction is recursively defined, as a fraglet that transforms itself in a simpler one, while generating a new fraglet in one of the destination stores.
The cryptographic version of fraglets, namely the cryptofraglets, was firstly introduced in [24, 15] , In [25] , new instructions for hashing and message authentication coding, and their verification, were introduced. Table 3 shows the entire set of cryptographic instructions. Table 3 Crypto-instructions for encryption, decryption, hashing, and message authentication coding
The encryption instruction enc takes as input the [enc newtag k 1 tail] fraglet, consisting of the reserved instruction tag enc, an auxiliary tag t, the encryption key k, and a generic sequence of symbols tail, representing the meaningful payload to be encrypted. It returns [t tail], with the auxiliary tag and the cyphertext tail k . The decryption instruction dec acts in the complementary way.
Instruction hash applies an hash function to the generic sequence of symbols tail. Instruction hashi performs hash iteration, i.e., the application of the hash function h i times on tail :
h(tail) . . .).
Therefore, it is a transformation rule operating on the fraglet [hashi t i tail]. Hash iteration is useful to model the Lamport's scheme, namely one-time passwords based on sequences of values iteratively obtained computing a hash function on a shared secret [19] . The Lamport's scheme is widely used for authentication purposes and to guarantee the property of "forward secrecy" (see Section 4 for an example of application). The hashi fraglet for hash iteration is able to transform itself and evolve to a single hash fraglet, eventually resulting in a fraglet with a tag and a tail sequence as input to a hash function h, when i becomes 0.
The fraglet [hmac t k tail] evolves to compute the hashed-MAC (Message Authentication Code), commonly realized with the combination of a shared key k and a message (the tail sequence). The fraglet transforms itself to a hashed fraglet, with the concatenation of the tail sequence plus the key as input to the hash function h. Operator ∥ denotes concatenation of symbols.
In this paper, we make the so called perfect cryptography assumption and we consider encryption as a black box: an encrypted (sequence of) symbol(s) cannot be correctly learnt unless with the right decryption key. Similarly, we consider hash functions to be collisionresistant and non-invertible. This approach is standard in (most of) the analysis of cryptographic communication protocols, see, e.g., [3, 11, 13, 14] . Table 4 defines simple rules for hash verification. Instruction hv let a computation proceed with tail2 if two symbols sequences tail1 in two different fraglets with matching tags are equal. In a complementary way, instruction hnv let a computation proceed if two symbols sequences tail1 and tail3 in two different fraglets with matching tags are disequal. The role of these two control instructions will be clarified in Section 4. 
Tags key, msg, and kmsg are auxiliary. In the above example, we assume that S A and S B are the only stores at stake, and that, originally, there are no other fraglets than the ones in the initial pool at A and B.
Executable fraglets in Maude
The set of fraglets programming instructions in Tables 1, 2, 3, 4 consists of rewrite rules [18, 20] , with a simple rewriting semantics in which the left-hand side pattern (to the left of →) is replaced by corresponding instances of the right-hand side one. They represent local transition rules in a possibly distributed, concurrent system. Thus, we assume the presence of a rewrite system (defined by a single step transition operator →, with → * as its transitive and reflexive closure) operating on fraglets by means of the rewrite rules corresponding to the fraglets programming instructions. If we let f, f ′ range over fraglets, by applying operations from the rewrite system to a fraglets' set F, a new fraglets'
The affinity between fraglets programming instructions and rewrite rules makes the former amenable for execution in Maude. Maude is "a programming language that models (distributed) systems and the actions within those systems" [18] . The system is specified by defining algebraic data types axiomatizing system's states, and rewrite rules axiomatizing system's local transitions.
We have defined an algebra for cryptofraglets, i.e., the sorts (types for values), and the equationally specifiable operators acting on those sorts (and constants). Also, we have defined the rewrite laws for describing the transitions that occur within and between the set of operators. The set of rewrite laws represents the set of (crypto)fraglets instructions given in the tables of Section 2.
The complete Maude specification of cryptofraglets, together with appropriate equations for all the declared operators, is available at http://mib.projects.iit.cnr.it/ mone16/cryptofraglets.html. The specification consists of the three modules FRAGLETS, FRAGLETS-RULES, and CRYPTO-FRAGLETS-RULES.
The functional module FRAGLETS provides declarations of sorts, e.g., fraglets, symbols, stores, and keys, and operators on those sorts, e.g., concatenation of fraglets and concatenations of fraglet stores. It also defines subsort relationships. For instance, symbols, stores, and keys are seen as specialized fraglets, meaning that all variables of sorts symbols, stores, and keys are fraglets too. The module also provides reserved ground terms representing the names of the instructions (match, matchp, send, . . . ).
Module FRAGLETS-RULES defines the rewrite rules encoding the instructions given in Tables 1 and 2 , plus core instructions non reported here for the sake of brevity.
Finally, module CRYPTO-FRAGLETS-RULES defines the rewrite rules for encryption, decryption, hashing and message authentication code. Decryption and hash verification are defined as conditional rules (crl [DEC], crl [HNV] ): decryption is possible only if the key used for encryption is equal to the key that one intends to use to decrypt. A hash value is verified only if it equals to some other hash that a fraglet store is able to compute.
To actually do something with those modules, Maude uses appropriate strategies for rule application. A Maude default strategy is implemented by the rewrite command, that explores one possible sequence of rewrites, starting by a set of rules and an initial state [18] . For example, plugging in "rew [enc t k tail] ." into the Maude environment, we obtain as a result "[t crypt(tail, k)]". The search command is also very convenient. A priori, it gives all the possible sequence of rewrites between an initial and a final state supplied by the user. Practically, since for certain systems the search could not terminate, the command is decorated with an optional bound on the number of desired solutions and on the maximum depth of the search.
In next sections, we show the fraglets specification of a RFID protocol guaranteeing a set of security properties. We will describe properties analysis example in Section 4, through the use of basic strategies. All the analysis examples shown in the paper illustrate how the implementation of fraglets in Maude allows us to exploit the Maude's analysis toolset. In this respect, it is worth noting that in the above analyses we have made use of only basic Maude capabilities. There are several other Maude tools whose use remains to be investigated (e.g., its SAT solver, its reachability analyser and its LTL model checker).
Threat model
This section introduces a new threat model for fraglets. We identify nodes A B C, . . . of a communication network as fraglets stores, viz. S A , S B , S C , . . . . Thus, principals of a communication protocol are fraglets stores, within which fraglets (protocol code + protocol messages) are being processed. In particular, communications are via the send ("one to one" communication) and mcast ("one to many" communication) instructions.
We consider a protocol specification involving two, or more, honest roles. In case of two roles, we can call them viz. the initiator S S and the responder S R . Moreover, when modeling and verifying security properties of communication protocols, it is quite common to include an additional intruder whose aim is to subvert the protocol's correct behaviour. A protocol specification is then considered secure w.r.t. a security property if it satisfies this property despite the presence of the intruder. We model the intruder as an untrusted store S X , which can eavesdrop (and possibly modify) the fraglets exchanged between S S and S R (or, more generally, among a set of honest stores).
We do not a priori fix any specific behaviour for the adversary. S X can process fraglets by means of all the instructions presented in Section 2. S X can also honestly engage in a security protocol. To this aim, the pool of fraglets at S X can contain also symmetric keys k SX and k RX , shared with, e.g., S S and S R , respectively. Concerning cryptographic keys, we assume that, at deployment, each store S I contains the pool of keys Λ I needed for the store to perform encryptions and decryptions. We also assume that shared secret keys are initially contained only by the legitimate stores that share those keys. Figure 1 shows how a multicast communication is activated among a subset of stores. Each store, within a universe of available stores, process fraglets representing both code and messages to run communication protocols sessions. Instruction mcast at store S A can be programmed to list the subset of stores that will actually receive messages from S A . In particular, solid arrows represent actual communication (i.e., S B and S X receive messages from S A ), while dashed arrows represent potential communication (i.e., in principle, communication with S A and S C is possible, but not activated in the figure example). Note that, when specifying security protocols, the adversary store S X is always included in the list of stores of every mcast instruction, to model, at least, eavesdropping.
Apart from some fraglets resident at the stores (denoted, resp., as [restA] , [someB] , [someC] , and [someX] ), Adversary's knowledge The adversary's knowledge [9, 23] is the set of all the messages an adversary knows from the beginning (its initial knowledge) united with the messages it can derive from the ones intercepted during a run of the protocol. In terms of fraglets, the adversary knowledge is the set of all fraglets hosted at S X , at a given state of the computation.
Let F SX be the set of fraglets contained by S X .
Definition 1 The intruder's knowledge
for some generic auxiliary or instruction tag t i , i = 0, . . . , m.
Security properties: Secrecy Secrecy is one of the most common security properties. Intuitively, a message is secret when it is only known by the parties that should share that secret. Thus, in a fraglet context, a symbol (or sequence of symbols) is a secret between S S and S R when it is not possible for S X to know that symbol (sequence).
We let F 0 SS and F 0 SR to be the initial, and fixed (according to the protocol in which the honest roles are engaged), set of fraglets stored at, resp., S S and S R , at the beginning of the computation.
Analogously, F 0 SX is the set of fraglets initially contained by S X . A priori, we do not make any assumption on this set, apart from the fact that it does not contain private information of the honest roles, such as, e.g., shared secret key between S S and S R .
Definition 2 The secrecy property Sec(tail)
This means that, for every possible set of fraglets initially contained by the adversary's store, and for every possible union of fraglets' sets contained at S S , S X , and S R that are derivable from the initial sets by applying every possible rule of the rewrite system, S X will never know the secret sequence.
Fraglet specification of a RFID protocol
In this section, we provide a specification of a RFID protocol through cryptofraglets, together with the modelling of some of its provided security properties. We firstly introduce the RIPP-FS [5] protocol, that guarantees RFID tag privacy, mutual authentication and forward secrecy and, then, we provide the protocol fraglets formulation. It belongs to the family of protocols based on the concept of key synchronization between RFID tags and server, like [1, 22, 28, 29] . A subsequent version of the protocol eRIPP-FS [6] was proposed to limit a timing attack to which some hardware implementation could be potentially exposed.
Before introducing the protocol, we briefly recall some security notions. With tag privacy we indicate the property for which a passive attacker cannot distinguish two answers of a same tag, provided that she cannot distinguish between a hmac value and a pseudo random generated number. Mutual authentication is the property through which two entities prove each other their own identity. Forward secrecy ensures that the knowledge of a piece of information does not disclose any information about the past. In the particular case of RIPP-FS, the knowledge of the key of a captured tag does not disclose any information about the previous answers of that tag.
Finally, we informally mention the concept of desynchronization resistance: several RFID authentication protocols rely on the agreed renewal of a piece of information shared between a tag and the server. When the tag has to be identified, it renews the secret in order to provide the answer expected by the server. However, several implementations of this mechanism ( [1, 22, 28] ) are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, which force the tag to reach an irrecoverable state, where its shared piece of information is no more aligned with the
then tag read else tag unknown Fig. 2 The RIPP-FS protocol one on the server. In particular, every tag has a maximum number of times it can answer correctly, and after reaching this value the tag will not reply to the reader's queries. Since the tags update their shared information with a value provided by any reader, an adversary could simply provide to the tags enough readings to make the tag time-stamp exceed its value and make the tag no more identifiable. A RFID protocol that is immune to this type of attack is said to be resistant against desynchronization attacks.
The RIPP-FS protocol
RIPP-FS, introduced in [5, 6] , is a privacy preserving identification protocol for RFID tags: it is able to perform the scanning of multiple tags with only one reading, avoiding the tracking of the tags among subsequent readings. The main idea of the RIPP-FS protocol is that a tag replies to a reader with a different answer each time it is queried: if it recognizes a legitimate query, then it answers correctly, else it replies with a random string of the same length of the correct one. The answer can be recognized only knowing a secret piece of information, shared between the tag and the server. Figure 2 concisely describes the computations and the message exchanges of the protocol. The main building block of RIPP-FS is the use of a Lamport's scheme to provide the authentication of the reader: each tag stores a value A i that uses to verify the authenticity of readers' query at time i, since A i is the result of the iteration of a hash function h over a secret value A 0 , namely
means the function h iterated k times, h(h(. . . (·)) . . .).
In particular, to authenticate a reading, once receiving a new value A j and a time j (with j > i), the tag must verify that h δ (A j ) = A i , where δ = j − i. The collision resistance and the preimage resistance properties of hash functions guarantee that only the entity that knows A 0 could also know the value A j , since hash functions are one-way and evaluate the pre-image is practically unfeasible.
The same properties are exploited to guarantee the forward secrecy, since the same hash function is used to modify the shared key of a tag, in order to generate a different answer for each reading. In particular, before answering to an authenticated reader, the tag iterates several times the function h over its key, in order to update the key to the current time j. This ensures that if the adversary captures the tag and extracts the key k j , she would be unable to evaluate the previous keys
To obtain key secrecy, the updated key is not straightforwardly sent to the reader, but instead it is used by the tag to generate a reply that is a hmac value, namely h(k updated ∥j). This ensures that the shared key is never transmitted during the execution of the protocol. Eavesdropping all the communications or sending malicious messages provides no information about the shared key. Finally, if the authentication value A j does not pass the check h δ (A j ) ≡ A i , then the tag will reply with a pseudo random number of the same length of a hmac value. In this way, any reader that does not know the expected hmac h(k updated ∥j) is unable to determine if the reply is a pseudo random number or a legitimate reply.
Finally, the tag updates its key and correctly replies only when it receives a reading including a genuine authentication value A j , then it can not be fooled to go out-of-sync. An attacker can only eavesdrop and replay genuine authentication values, but the tag will only update when the received value refers to a value greater than the last genuine value it has previously answered to: since the authentication value A j has been eavesdropped, any new authentication value sent by the genuine reader will be something like A j ′ with j ′ ≥ j. This means that a tag that has answered to an eavesdropped A j and that receives a genuine A j ′ , it will recognize an authentication value related to a reading (j ′ ) that is ahead in time to the one it has already answered (j), avoiding the risk of a de-synchronization attack.
RIPP-FS fraglet specification
In this section, we introduce a fraglets specification of the RIPP-FS protocol executable in Maude. The reader can be specified as follows: The reader's store contains an initial set of fraglets (protocol messages + protocol code) to perform its steps of the protocol: it can broadcast the authentication value and the time, it can evaluate the expected answer of the tag and verify the actual answer of the tag. It is worth noting the use of the fraglet instruction hashi that 1) produces the authval iterating max-delta times the hash function over the auth0 value and 2) builds the new shared key iterating h over the initial k0tag1 key. In particular, this evaluation originates from the combination with the delta fraglet message that corresponds to the reading number. Finally, we use the two hash verification instructions hv and hnv : only one of them will react with the expmac tag, that is hv if the check is passed, hnv otherwise. The tag can be specified as follows: The initial fraglets in the tag's store start reacting with the reception of a fraglet with the authl tag. This ignites the reaction of the authentication value check and, then, the broadcast of the answer. It is worth noting that, if the hash verification does not succeed, then the pseudo-random value is sent, since the fraglet with authlast will react with the hnv fraglet. Otherwise, the fraglet reaction will produce the update of the key with the hashi cryptofraglet, the evaluation of the legitimate answer with the hmac cryptofraglet and the broadcast of the hmac value, with the mcast anyone fraglet.
Modelling security properties with fraglets
In this section, we show some security analysis over the fraglets specification of RIPP-FS. We highlight that the examples we depict in the following do not guarantee the fulfillment of the properties under all the possible configurations of the fraglets at stake. For instance, an exhaustive analysis of the protocol would necessitate to explore all the possible initial configurations of the fraglets stores representing the tag, the reader, and the adversary, as well as interactions among the potential universe of other fraglets stores. However, this kind of analysis is out of scope in this paper, whose main purpose is to show how the bio-inspired fraglet paradigm can model protocols as well as security properties.
Key secrecy against passive eavesdropping
To model the key secrecy against a passive eavesdropper, we introduce a malicious reader that eavesdrops on all the communications between a genuine reader and a legitimate tag. It silently exploits the inherently insecure wireless channel to collect the messages exchanged by the honest parties. Her aim is to collect the secret shared key of the tag or any other useful piece of information that would enable its disclosure.
To verify that the key is never disclosed, we leverage the Maude search command that explores all the possible derivatives of a given initial configuration. In particular, to model our adversary, we ask for any final state where the adversary knows the key, as follows: With the above Maude excerpt we are looking for any possible evolution of the model in which the malreader's store contains a fraglet with the key of the tag: t1 and t2 can be any fraglet (even nil or a tag), while more denotes any other possible tag within the store; rest denotes the remaining fraglets of the model that correspond to the stores of tag1 and the genuine reader. The omitted parts denoted with ... are the protocol specification as in Section 4.2. The outcome of the above specification is the following: showing that all the possible branches of the model never reached a state in which the key secrecy was violated by the malicious reader.
We remark that the excerpt only describes one possible system configuration: other settings can be explored considering different evolutions of the tag key to be disclosed (for example k0tag1, h(k0tag1) and so on) or different sets of initial fraglets in the malicious reader's store (for example to make the eavesdropped data reacting with other fraglets).
Tag privacy against passive eavesdropping
Similarly to the key secrecy, we check tag privacy with the Maude search command. In particular, we model the prior knowledge of the malicious reader including in its store some hmacs collected during previous exchanges between the genuine reader and two different RFID tags (tag1 and tag2 ). Moreover, we provide the malreader with a secret key (k ), possibly extracted from a third tag. Finally, the malicious reader's store has a set of fraglets that can react with any eavesdropped hmac. We ask Maude to find any evolution of the system in which the cryptofraglet that successfully verifies the hmac reacts within the store of the malicious reader. Thus, we model the tag privacy as follows: meaning that the malicious reader is unable to relate the eavesdropped 'hmac-tag with any of the possible tags.
Note that other possible configurations can consider more fraglets in the malicious reader's store, in order to model a different prior knowledge or more hacking strategies, for example one that tries to disclose the information within the hmac fraglet and to relate them with any of the possible tags.
De-synchronization resistance
Protection against de-synchronization is tested considering if the malicious reader is able to make the tag unreadable to the reader. In order to test this property, we consider a scenario in which the malicious reader tries to send the t max time, that corresponds to the last possible answer of the tag. Since the starting authentication value is unknown to the malicious reader, she can only reuse unrelated authentication values, eventually collected during previous genuine readings. The aim of the malicious reader is to induce the tag to update its key according to the specific sent time.
In order to check this property, we again exploit the Maude search command to verify if exists a possible evolution from the initial configuration in which the tag updates its key according to the t max value. Then, we start from an initial configuration in which the tag has updated its key to the time t 2 and the malicious reader sends t max joined all the previous sent authentication values. We ask Maude to search a possible evolution of the configuration in which the tag has a fraglet that corresponds to the updated private key. 
---last used shared key ---last auth. value h(h(. . .(k) . . .) that corresponds to the 10th iteration of the hash function on the shared key k.
Forward secrecy against a tag capture
In order to test the forward secrecy property, we simply model the store of the malicious reader. We initialise a configuration where the attacker has eavesdropped some previous successfully acknowledged protocol readings of some tags (tag1 and tag2) and, some time later -eventually after some other readings, she violates the two tags and extracts all the cryptographic material inside them. We ask Maude if the adversary is able to relate any of the collected messages with any of the tags she compromised. The fraglets in the store of the malicious reader can combine in many ways, realizing a kind of brute force attack against the collected hmac. This is the outcome of the Maude execution: Again, there was no evolution of the system in which the fraglets in the store were able to produce a 'OK fraglet. This outcome is because of the one-way property of the hash function, since we are assuming that there exists no practical mechanism to have a pre-image of a hashed value.
We remind the reader that the complete Maude specification of cryptofraglets, as well as the Maude files of the example analyses shown in the paper, are available at mib.projects.iit.cnr.it/mone16/cryptofraglets.html
Related Work
The BIONETS EU project [2] , BIOlogically inspired NETwork and Services, seeked inspiration from biological systems to provide a fully integrated network and service environment ,able to scale to large amounts of highly heterogeneous devices, and that is able to adapt and evolve in an autonomic way. The fraglets model has been extensively adopted in BIONETS and some security and trust extensions to the original model have become necessary to make it a running framework. That was the main reason why cryptofraglets were born, first from a theoretical point of view, then realising a prototypal implementation of cryptofraglets in Maude to run some toy example analyses [17] . Successively, the implementation was extended in [25] , to deal with a larger set of cryptographic primitives, widely adopted in standard security protocols.
In the literature, there exist remarkable examples of the use of rewriting systems for modelling security protocols and analysing their properties, including, e.g., [21, 8, 10] . Work in [21] shows how the Dolev-Yao model [7] of security protocol analysis may be-formalized using a notation based on multi-set rewriting with existential quantification and exemplifies the formalisation of subtle security properties. Under the same context, in [8] the authors analyze the complexity of the secrecy problem under various restrictions, showing that, even with a restricted size of messages, the secrecy problem is undecidable for the case of an unrestricted number of protocol roles and an unbounded number of freshly generated messages (so called nonces). The open complexity problem is indeed the main issue that one needs to explore for better defining limits and advantages in adopting cryptofraglets for security analysis. Indeed, as pointed out in the above sections, the example analyses that we have shown consider a limited number of actors and no generation of fresh messages. Finally, for page limits, we refer the interested reader to the tutorial in [10] , describing the Maude-NRL Protocol Analyzer, a Maude-based tool for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. The tutorial also points to related work in the area of security protocols models and analysis, with an eye to rewriting systems.
Conclusions
In this paper, we moved from an extended model for cryptofraglets, with primitives for multicasting, hashing, and message authentication coding. Based on this communication model and on a threat model where fraglets stores can engage in communication protocols together with passive and active intruders, we presented the modelling and analysis of a set of security properties of a wireless protocol. Even exploiting only a minimal set of the verification tool capabilities and paving the way for further investigation (like, e.g., the presence of more actors in a protocol run), the results show the effectiveness of the cryptofraglets framework for the model and analysis of security communication protocols.
